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1. Botnet Ad Fraud 
Today, botnets (collections of software agents 
running autonomously and automatically, 
typically on compromised end users’ PCs) are a 
very popular tool for perpetrating distributed 
attacks on the Internet. Botnets are a serious 
threat for a number of entities: end users, 
enterprises with online businesses, websites, 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), advertisers and 
ad networks (ANs). Consequently, thwarting 
botnets would benefit everyone and would 
reduce the level of online crime on the Internet. 
However, the problem of botnets in general 
cannot be solved exclusively by users (lack of 
know-how), ISPs (too expensive to fight botnets 
alone), ad networks, advertisers, websites and 
enterprises (lack of tools and resources). 
 
Recent initiatives propose that ISPs should 
perform the detection of botnets and remediation 
of the infected devices [1, 2]. Indeed, it is the 
ISPs that are in the best position to thwart the 
botnets. Yet, the revenues of ISPs are not 
(directly) affected by the botnets and ISPs would 
probably welcome some external funding in the 
efforts to fight botnets (e.g., government-
sponsored programs in Australia [2]). In the case 
governments are unwilling to fund these 
initiatives, ISPs need to find a way to make them, 
at the very least, cost neutral if not cost positive.  
 
Over the last decade, online advertising has 
become a major component of the Web, leading 
to annual revenues expressed in tens of billions 
of US Dollars (e.g., 22.4 billion in the US in 
2009 [3]). The business model of a fast growing 
number of online services is based on online 
advertising and much of the Internet activity 
depends on that source of revenue. 
Unsurprisingly, people started abusing the 
advertising system in various ways. Lately, it is 
becoming more and more popular to use botnets 
for ad fraud [4, 5], which creates a loss of ad 
revenue for advertisers, associated websites and 
ANs and security threats for end users (e.g., 
fraudulent ads that lead to phishing attacks). 
Therefore, ANs have economic incentives to 
fight botnets.  
 
However, ANs are not in the best position to 
thwart botnets themselves and thus ANs might 
be willing to subsidize the ISPs to achieve that 
goal. We investigate whether ad fraud botnets 
are a strong enough reason for ISPs and ANs to 
cooperate. Such cooperation would help ISPs 
deploy detection and remediation mechanisms 
and would be a first step towards fighting all 
botnets. 
 
2. System Model 
We consider a system consisting of an online 
advertising system, a number of bots that attempt 
to exploit the online advertising system and an 
ISP, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. System Model: Online Advertising 
System, ISP and bots exploiting the 
advertising system. 
 
The most prevalent model of serving online ads 
to end users is depicted in Figure 1. To have 
their ads appear with the appropriate web content, 
Advertisers (AV) subscribe with an ad network 
(AN) whose role is to automatically embed ads 
into web pages. Ad networks have contracts with 
Websites (WS) that want to host advertisements. 
When a User (U) visits a website (step 1) that 
hosts ads, while downloading the content of the 
web page (step 2), the user's browser will be 
directed to communicate with one of the Ad 
Servers (AS) belonging to the AN (step 3). The 
AS chooses and serves (step 4) the most 
appropriate ads to the user, such that users' 
interests are matched and the potential revenue is 
maximized.  
 
We consider the types of ad fraud: (i) in which 
malware causes infected devices to display 
altered ads, which have been the most prominent 
lately [4, 5] and (ii) in which subverted users' 
routers modify ad traffic on-the-fly between a 
web server and a user [6]. When users click on 
the altered ads, the clicks generate revenue for 
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the bot master instead of the AN. Thus, the bots 
divert a part of the ad revenue from the AN.  
3. Countermeasures 
One possible approach for ANs to protect their 
revenue is to improve the security of the online 
advertising systems, thus making it more 
difficult for an adversary to successfully exploit 
those systems. For example, ad fraud can be 
reduced if webpages and ads are served over 
HTTPS instead of HTTP. The cost of 
implementing HTTPS at a web server includes 
the cost of obtaining a valid X.509 authentication 
certificate. Usually, website owners are not 
willing to bear this cost. Thus, if an AN wants 
the secure protocol to be deployed, it should 
cover the costs itself [7]. The AN may decide to 
selectively secure only the websites that generate 
sufficient ad revenue that compensates the costs. 
 
Another possible approach for ANs to protect 
their revenue is to cooperate with ISPs and 
eliminate the major cause of the revenue loss, 
namely botnets. They can do so by funding the 
existing initiatives for ISPs to detect and remove 
botnets, since ISPs are in a privileged position to 
fight botnets. As removing botnets would benefit 
ANs, they have economic incentives to subsidize 
ISPs to thwart botnets. 
 
4. Game-Theoretic Model 
We introduce a static game to analyze the 
interaction between an ISP and an AN. In our 
model, the ISP can choose between the two 
actions: Abstain (A) and Cooperate (C). The AN 
can choose one of the following four actions: 
Abstain (A), Cooperate (C), Secure and 
Cooperate (S+C), and Secure (S). The Abstain 
models the ISP that is not willing to fight botnets 
and the AN not willing to perform any 
countermeasures. When cooperating, the ISP 
first detects the bots and then remediates infected 
devices, for which it receives a reward from the 
cooperative AN. The AN can secure the websites 
by choosing the action S. Finally, the AN can 
choose to simultaneously secure some of the 
websites and cooperate with the ISP to remediate 
some of the infected devices. The analytical 
results of our game-theoretic analysis are 
presented in details in [8]. 
 
In order to understand the implications of the 
analytical results in reality, we simulate the game 
using the real data on the ad traffic generated on 
the 1000 most popular websites obtained from 
Compete.com. We compute numerically the 
payoffs of the static game and identify the 
resulting equilibria. We represent the outcomes 
of the game for 104 bots in the system in Figure 2 
and Figure 3. Figure 2 shows the number of 
secured websites depending on the fraction λ of 
the revenue that bots divert from the AN. When 
the AN cooperates with the ISP, the fraction of 
remediated devices depending on the level of 
threat λ is shown in Figure 3. We consider three 
scenarios, for three different efficiencies PD of 
the detection system employed by the ISP. 
 
Figure 2. Number of the most popular 
websites to be secured 
 
Figure 3. Fraction of infected devices 
remediated by the ISP 
 
The obtained results illustrate that: (i) For a very 
low level of threat (λ<2·10-4) no countermeasures 
will be taken (no websites are secured and no 
infected devices are remediated); (ii) When the 
fraction λ of the diverted revenue increases, the 
AN secures a number of websites that depends 
on λ; (iii) Securing websites is not sufficient for 
an even higher level of threat (e.g., λ>10-4 for 
PD=0.1), thus the AN will in addition cooperate 
with the ISP to remediate infected devices. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The game-theoretic analysis of the behavior and 
interactions of the ISPs and ANs facing botnet ad 
fraud shows that cooperation could emerge under 
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certain conditions that mostly depend on: (i) the 
number of infected devices (ii) the aggregate 
power with which bots divert revenue from the 
AN and (iii) the efficiency of the botnet 
detection system. The cooperation is a win-win 
situation where: (i) users benefit from the ISP's 
help in maintaining the security of users' devices; 
(ii) the AN protects its ad revenue as the botnet 
ad fraud is reduced; (iii) it is at least cost neutral, 
if not cost positive for the ISP to fight botnets. 
Cooperation between the AN and the ISP would 
help to reduce the level of online crime and 
improve the Web security in general. 
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